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USING STATE LAW TO PROTECT FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: SOME
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT
CONVERSE·1983
AKHIL REED AMAR·
Several years ago, I published an overly long article entitled
''OJ Sovereignty and Federalism."1 The article touched on many
issues-nullification, secession, the Tenth Amendment, and sov-
ereign immunity, to name a few. Some of the issues raised in the
article have been rather widely discussed-among Supreme Court
Justices, on various federal courts of appeals, and in the general
law review literature. Although participants in these discussions
may not always agree with my ideas, they at least seem aware of
them. Yet in regard to what I considered the most interesting
section of the article, involving what I labelled "converse-1983"
laws, the judicial, legislative, and academic response has been
almost complete silence. Perhaps this is because my analysis of
converse-1983 laws was so obvious-or alternatively, so obviously
wrong-that no response seemed necessary. However, on the off
chance that my initial approach was neither obvious nor obviously
wrong, I now propose to reexamine converse-1983 laws. At the
very least, this reexamination can help clarify various issues of
federalism and jurisdiction, of right and remedy. But more am-
bitiously, I hope this reexamination will make the legal community
more aware of a dramatic set of progressive actions that states
may take in the service of federal constitutional rights.
In keeping with the socratic tradition of law teaching and
federal jurisdiction scholarship,2 I shall conduct this reexamination
through the device of questions and answers.
• Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This essay derives from the Coen Lecture,
delivered on September 14, 1992, at the University of Colorado School of Law. An earlier
version was delivered on July 25, 1992 to the Roscoe Pound Foundation/Yale Law School
Forum For State Court Judges.
I. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
2. See. e.g., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3rd ed. 1988); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362
(1953). For a nice discussion of this dialectic tradition, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE 57 (1982).
159
HeinOnline -- 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 160 1993
160 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
1. What are converse-1983 laws?
Converse-1983 is the label I gave to a proposed type of state
law designed to provide a remedy or cause of action for violations
of federal constitutional rights committed by federal officials.
Whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal law remedy/cause
of action for federal constitutional violations perpetrated by state
officials, a converse-1983 law would provide a state law remedy/
cause of action for federal constitutional violations perpetrated by
federal officials. Such a converse-1983 law would both invoke and
invert the logic and language of § 1983, and might read something
like this:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, custom, or usage, of the United States, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of this state or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Consti-
tution, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Let me be clear: no state has (yet) adopted such a converse-
1983 law. But I believe states can and should adopt these laws. If
properly framed and applied, these laws are deeply in keeping with
the letter and spirit of the United States Constitution, and should
be upheld by the United States Supreme Court. What's more,
although states have never adopted such a self-conscious state law
remedy for federal constitutional violations committed by federal
officials, state law has, ever since the Founding, provided a rich
set of unselfconscious remedies against unconstitutional conduct
by federal officials. For example, prior to the 1971 case of Bivens
v. Six Unknown Federal Agents,3 the state law of trespass provided
virtually the only civil remedy against Fourth Amendment viola-
tions perpetrated by federal officials. This line of trespass cases,
along with many other historical examples of state law remedies
against federal lawlessness, strongly supports the constitutionality
of the more systematic and self-conscious converse-1983 laws I am
proposing here.
2. How could a converse-1983 law come into
existence?
The federal Constitution does not specify in great detail the
precise mechanisms by which states may create legal norms; in-
3. 403 U,S. 388 (1971).
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stead, the allocation of lawmaking is largely governed by state
constitutions (constrained at the margins, of course, by federal
norms such as due process, equal protection, and republican gov-
ernment). Typically, a new state converse-1983 norm could emerge
in any of three ways. First, it could become part of the state
constitution via initiative, referendum, convention or special leg-
islative action. Second, a state .legislature by a simple majority
could enact converse-1983 language as an ordinary state statute.
Third, state judges have power to fashion legal norms-such as
converse-1983-as part of the common law process. Such common
law norms, like the norm against trespass already mentioned, can
be, and for over 200 years have been, invoked against federal
officials.
The role of judge-made common law in the enforcement of
federal constitutional rights is highlighted by the Bivens case men-
tioned earlier. As Bivens reminds us, courts-state courts no less
than federal courts-can, pursuant to their common law function,
infer private causes of action for violations of legal rules laid down
in statutes and constitutions. We need look no further than Mar-
bury v. Madisorz4 to see the deep roots of this tradition. Following
the ancient maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium-where there is a right,
there should be a remedy-Chief Justice Marshall in effect inferred
a private right of action for William Marbury to sue for an alleged
violation of a congressional statute vesting him with a commission
to serve as a justice of the peace. This statute did not say in so
many words that if a commission were unlawfully withheld, its
holder would have a right to sue for it; the statute, in modern
parlance, did not create an express cause of action. 5 But the court
in effect fashioned such a private cause of action by treating a
commission as a kind of property right, akin to a deed to a piece
of land.6 Put another way, Marshall assimilated the statute into
the more general set of common law norms of property law-
common law norms that permit a property owner to sue to protect
his property.
State courts have used the common law of torts in a similar
fashion over the last two centuries. If a legislature passes a safety
statute, without providing an explicit cause of action, the tradi-
4. 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. [d. at 172. For further discussion of this aspect of Marbury, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Marbury, Section 13. and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 443, 447-48 (1989).
6. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 155, 165, 171.
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tional approach of state courts has been to allow parties whom
the statute was designed to protect to sue under the general com-
mon law of negligence. But instead of being required to prove
negligence under all the particular facts and circumstances, the
plaintiff is allowed to point to the defendant's violation of the
safety statute as negligence per se.7 In effect, the common law has
thereby inferred a private cause of action for the statutory viola-
tion.
State courts have done this not only for state safety (and
other) statutes, but also for violations of federal statutes, as in
the classic case of Moore v; Chesapeake & Ohio Railway.s And
as Bivens reminds us, the same common law remedy-fashioning
process is also appropriate when the federal Constitution, rather
than a federal statute, is at stake.
Indeed, in two respects the argument for inferring state causes
of action for violation of the federal Constitution is even stronger
than for fashioning similar causes of action for violation of federal
statutes. First, statutes can and often do expressly provide for
private causes of action. By the logic of expressio unius, a statute
that does not so provide could perhaps plausibly be read as inten-
tionally rejecting private causes of action as enforcement mechan-
isms. By contrast, the federal Constitution nowhere explicitly creates
such a cause of action. (And how could it, without deteriorating
into the kind of "prolix legal code" disparaged in McCulloch v.
Maryland?9) Therefore, its failure to do so in, say, the Fourth
Amendment offers no good expressio unius argument against pri-
vate enforcement via state common law trespass causes of action.
Second, as we shall see in more detail below, state causes of action
for violations of federal statutes are subject to much more serious
preemption problems than state causes of action under the federal
Constitution.
7. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934). The classic English case here is Gorris v.
Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874). See also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298-301
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (collecting cases and other materials).
8. 291 U.S. 205 (1934). In Moore, the United States Supreme Court discussed how
state tort law could incorporate federal safety standards set out in a federal statute. See
also HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 561, 945 & n.3 (discussing Moore and other
cases). For further discussion and analysis of state law-created private causes of action for
violation of federal statutes, see Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal
Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144
(1985).
9. 17 U.S. (4 WheaL) 316 (1819).
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·3. Must states act in concert in adopting converse-1983
rules?
No. Even a single state, acting alone, could adopt a converse-
1983 rule. But once a single state did adopt such a rule, other
states might have strong incentives to follow suit, for reasons I
shall elaborate below. Of course, unless all states adopted identical
rules, questions would arise as to the appropriate scope of any
given state's converse-1983 rule. For example, should the converse-
1983 law of state X apply only if the constitutional violation
occurred in state X? Only if the constitutional violation injured a
citizen of state X? Only if the case is adjudicated in state X? Only
under some combination? But these questions are in no way unique
to converse-1983 norms; they are simply aspects of general choice
of law questions applicable to all state law. .
4. Doesn't converse-1983 violate basic principles of
federalism?
On the. contrary, converse-1983 is an expression-a celebra-
tion, really-of the American ideal of federalism, properly under-
stood. Let's consider various possible federalism-based objections.
a. The Article VI Supremacy Clause
Converse-1983 laws do not violate the Supremacy Clause; they
enforce it. The Supremacy Clause does not make federal statutes
or federal executive policy supreme; it makes the federal Consti-
tution supreme, and only federal laws and federal policies that are
.in conformity with-"in pursuance of"-the federal Constitution
are legitimate norms that may legitimately override state law. When
federal officials violate the federal Constitution, the conduct of
these officials is not supreme. State law and state courts may play
a role in enforcing the true supreme norm-the Constitution-
against those officials. Indeed, the Supremacy Clause, after em-
phatically asserting the supremacy of the Constitution, explicitly
charges state courts with both the right and the duty to enforce
the Constitution as supreme law. And this is exactly what a state
court creating a converse-1983 Cause of action would be doing:
enforcing the Constitution's rights by fashioning legal remedies.
b. Article III and Federal Court Supremacy
Of course, the analysis thus far may seem to have begged the
question of who decides whether the Constitution has in fact been
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violated. For if federal officials were not in fact violating the
Constitution, state-created liability would be an impermissible tax
on lawful federal activity, a de facto nullification of legitimate
federal law. Although the Article VI Supremacy Clause charges
state judges with the right and duty to interpret and enforce the
federal Constitution in cases properly before them, Article VI
nowhere' says that state courts shall, or even may, stand as the
last word on the proper interpretation of the federal Constitution.
On the contrary, as I and others have argued in great detail
elsewhere,1O Article III requires that the last word on "all cases
arising under the Constitution of the United States" be vested in
the federal judiciary. And every converse-1983 case would be a
true "arising under" case, for each case would invariably raise the
question of whether the federal officials had indeed violated the
federal Constitution. Thus, although state judges have a right and
a duty to make this determination in cases properly before ther.n,
Article III mandates that these state court pronouncements may
not stand as the last word; any state adjudication must be ap-
pealable to some Article III court.
For most federal question cases, Congress has implemented
this Article III mandate by providing for U.S. Supreme Court
review, via certiorari, of state high court rulings on federal law. II
In a few situations, however, Congress has gone even further, and
vested exclusive jurisdiction in lower federal courts, or provided
for removal from state trial courts to federal district courts. Con-
gress clearly has authority to provide for such exclusive and re-
moval jurisdiction under the language of Article III and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, as the Supreme Court suggested in
Martin v. Hunter's Lesseel2 and affirmed in The Moses Taylor. 13
In a case roughly contemporaneous to Moses Taylor, the Supreme
10. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-
Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Akhil Reed
Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651
(1990); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article lII, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984);
Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limi-
tations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981). See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304
(1816).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988).
12. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336-37 (1816).
13. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 428-31 (1866).
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Court in Tarble's Case l4 in effect construed jurisdictional rules to
require exclusive federal jurisdiction in habeas actions against fed-
eral officials. Many scholars today question the correctness of both
. the language and the holding of Tarble's Case;lS and of course,
Congress could overrule this holding anytime it wanted by provid-
ing for concurrent or exclusive state court jurisdiction over habeas
trials. But unless and until overturned by Congress, Tarble's Case
would prevent any state court from entertaining a converse-1983
action seeking habeas or habeas-like relief against a federal official.
It is still an open question in the Supreme Court whether Tarble's
Case should be expanded to encompass all state court injunctions
against federal officials. 16 But it is clear that in any event, .Tarble's
Case does not extend to state court damage actions against 'federal
officials l7-the heart of converse-1983. For two centuries, state
courts have had jurisdiction over these damage cases. But even
here, there is a critical wrinkle, for congressional removal statutes
allow many federal officials, if they so choose, to remove damage
actions from state court to a lower federal court. 18 Thus, as a
practical matter, a very high percentage of converse-1983 causes
of action may end up being tried in federal district courts.
Certification back to state courts for clarification of state
converse-1983 rules, however, may well be appropriate in certain
cases. But how, it might be asked, will a federal court know that
a state does indeed recognize converse-1983 liability, so that the
federal court will know that certification may be appropriate? Will
not every case be whisked away from state courts via removal,
before state courts can even consider the issue? Clearly, where
converse-1983 liability is created by a state statute, federal courts
can easily be made aware of the statute's existence. If instead,
state courts wish to recognize converse-1983 liability via the com-
mon law process, they need only drop a footnote in some other,
nonremovable case-say, a case inferring a state law cause of
action against a private party for violation of a federal statute.
The footnote need only say that the state judiciary might well be
willing to infer a similar cause of action against federal officials
14. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
15. See. e.g., HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 420 n.49, 488-92.
16. See id. at 490 (citing conflicting cases among lower courts).
17. [d. at 489. A recent federal statute makes the Federal Tort Claims Act the
exclusive remedy for various wrongs committed by federal officials, but expressly exempts
suits for federal constitutional violations, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (1988).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-43 (1988).
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for federal constitutional violations. Alternatively, the footnote
could appear in a case discussing the liability of state officials for
constitutional misdeeds, or in a dozen other situations. This foot-
note should suffice to alert both lawyers and federal courts of the
need to get a definitive ruling on state converse-1983 rules from
state judges. Of course, some might call the footnote "dicta"-
but then, most of Marbury v. Madison is dicta. And the purpose
of the dicta I am proposing here to state judges is the same as
Chief Justice Marshall's purpose in Marbury: to alert courts that
do have trial jurisdiction how another court with norm-declaring
authority might rule if it had jurisdiction.
Once again, however, after certification, it would remain for
the federal courts to take jurisdiction over the case to decide finally
the legal issues raised. It might at first seem as if my observations
about Supreme Court appellate review, Tarble's Case, and federal
officer removal take all the "punch" out of the converse-1983
idea. Have I not, in conceding federal judicial supremacy in in-
terpreting the federal Constitution, undercut the whole point of
converse-1983?
Absolutely not. At its core, converse-1983 is not about state
court judicial jurisdiction; it is about state law as a remedy appli-
cable in all courts, state and federal. Without a converse-1983
cause of action, many victims of federal lawlessness would simply
have no way of getting into any court, state or federal-just as
before Bivens, the only remedy for federal Fourth Amendment
violationg was furnished by state trespass law. Even if state courts
do not stand as the last or even the first word on cases involving
state law remedies for federal constitutional violations, these state
law remedies provide the substantive rules of decision in federal
courts. Even after Tarble's Case, state law remedies of habeas
corpus were enforceable in federal court. 19 And before Bivens,
state trespass law was applied in federal trial courts after federal
officers removed their cases from state courts.
Likewise, converse-1983 causes of action can, and indeed must,
be followed by federal judges, whether sitting in appellate review
of state courts via Supreme Court certiorari or sitting in district
courts via Tarble's Case or federal officer removal. Under the
19. Indeed, the Constitution's nonsuspension of habeas clause was clearly designed
to protect the state law remedy of habeas even if adjudication took place in federal courts.
In 1787, no federal habeas law existed, so the clause can only refer to the preexisting state
common law habeas. For extensive historical support, see WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126-80 (1980).
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Rules of Decision Act20 and the Tenth Amendment, a state stat-
utory cause of action (unless it somehow violates the federal
Constitution or a constitutional federal statute) is a substantive
law that federal courts must enforce. Thus, if a state statute created
a converse-1983 cause of action, that statute would furnish a
remedy applicable in federal court. And if the converse-1983 norm
were instead promulgated by state common law courts, the result
would be the same. That is the basic teaching of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins21 (which of course, as an interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act, applies in all federal court adjudication, not just
diversity cases).22 Indeed, Erie explicitly places on an equal footing
state common law made by state judges and state statutes made
by state legislatures: "whether the law of the state shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision
is not a matter of federal concern. "23 To repeat then: the converse-
1983 idea focuses on state judges not in their role as "ultimate
interpreters" of federal constitutional norms, for the federal Con-
stitution does not give them any such role,24 but rather in their
Erie role as state lawmakers, coordinate to state legislatures in
their ability to fashion substantive legal norms applicable even in
federal court.
c. McCulloch and the Spirit of Federalism
"But," it might be said, "let's put all the technicalities about
Article VI, Article III, the Rules of Decision Act, and federal
jurisdictional statutes to one side. Doesn't converse-1983 violate
the basic spirit of American federalism, as embodied in cases like
McCulloch v. Maryland?25 What right does a state have to impose
a de facto tax on federal officers qua federal officers? And why
should state law concern itself with whether the federal Constitu-
tion has been violated by the federal government and how that
violation should be remedied?"
These questions, though superficially forceful, miss the mark.
Recall the precise facts of McCulloch: Maryland believed that the
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 858 n.2.
23. 304 U.S. at 78. See also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 512 (1954) (describing this as Erie's "essential
rationale").
24. But see Hart, supra note 2, at 1401. Hart's view is criticized in the works cited
supra note 10.
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Second Federal Bank was unconstitutional; that Congress had no
enumerated power to create such a bank; and that the bank's
federal charter was thus null and void. Maryland therefore imposed
a tax on the bank, and when the bank officials refused to pay,
Maryland brought suit in its own state courts against bank official
McCulloch, fining him for his failure to comply with the Maryland
law. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. But note that
the Supreme Court nowhere denied the legitimacy of the jurisdic-
tion exercised by the state court below in an action for damages,
of sorts, against a federal official alleged to be part of an uncon-
stitutional federal operation. Note also how the Supreme Court
structured its analysis in McCulloch. The first question, said the
Court, was whether the bank was in fact constitutional. Only after
assuring itself that the bank was indeed, consistent with the federal
Constitution-"necessary and proper"-did the Court address what
it labelled as the second question in the case: whether the state of
Maryland could nonetheless impose its tax. The structure of the
Court's analysis and several passages in the opinion26 plainly imply
that if the bank had indeed peen unconstitutional,' perhaps state
law could impose liability on the bank official, Mr. McCulloch.
If anything, all this suggests that when federal officials are acting
in violation of the federal Constitution, state law-created liability
may well be appropriate at times.
Of course, if a state converse-1983 law were to provide for
liability far in excess of making a plaintiff whole, and far in excess
of the quantum of damages for other state causes of action, this
punitive converse-1983 law might offend the spirit of McCulloch.
Imagine, for example, a converse-1983 law that provided for one
million dollars of presumed damages for any Fourth Amendment
violation by federal officials, however technical the violation and
however minimal the actual harm to Fourth Amendment values of
property, personhood, and privacy. This presumed damage rule
could well be seen as a tax masquerading as a remedy, and thus
violative of McCulloch's spirit.
McCulloch might also be thought to disfavor any state law
that "discriminated against" federal officials. Unlike a general
trespass law applicable to all persons within a state, public and
26. Id. at 425-30 (speaking of "constitutional laws of the Union," "laws made in
pursuance of the constitution," "legitimate operations of a supreme government," and of
a federal "right . .. to preserve" the bank) (emphasis added). See also id. at 427 ("[t]he
power of congress to create, and of course, to continue, the' bank, was the subject of the
preceding part of this opinion; and is no longer to be considered as questionable. ").
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private, a converse-1983 law does indeed specially target federal
officers. But there are good reasons for this special targeting.
Federal officials wield special powers not enjoyed by ordinary
citizens, and are thus subject to various constitutional norms, such
as the Fourth Amendment, that do not apply to private actors.
Consider once again the facts of a typical Fourth Amendment
case. When federal officials brandishing badges, uniforms, guns,
and other trappings of the authority of Leviathan bang on the
door of an ordinary citizen and demand entrance, the citizen may
well "voluntarily" let them in. ("What choice do I have?," she
may well ask herself.) Under general rules of trespass "[a] private
citizen, asserting no authority . . . will not normally be liable in
trespass if he demands, and is granted, admission to another's
house. "27 But these general rules of trespass make much less sense
for federal officers, and if unsupplemented by additional safe-
guards, will result in many "unreasonable" searches within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even if no general trespass
occurred. Thus, as the Bivens Court noted, "one who demands
admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far
different position. "28 As a result, the Court acknowledged in pass-
ing, "state law may take into account the different status of one
clothed with the authority of the Federal Government"29-that is,
state law may specifically target federal officials to protect Fourth
Amendment values.
So far, we have been focusing on why states may create a
special cause of action against federal officials as opposed to
ordinary citizens. But converse-1983 raises a second, distinct "dis-
crimination" issue. Why should states be able to impose rules on
federal officials that do not apply equally to state officials? (Of
course, a state could avoid this second issue altogether by playing
it safe and drafting its converse-1983 rules to apply to unconsti-
tutional conduct under color of either state or federal law. The
interesting question, however, is what if a state chooses not to
"play it safe"-that is, chooses to provide a cause of action against
only federal officials.)
Although the question is, I admit, a close one, I would argue
that this discrimination is nevertheless acceptable, and indeed
27. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971) (citing torts
treatises).
28. [d.
29. [d. at 395. The Court, however, refused to allow the possibility of state law
remedies to block the creation of a federal common law remedy.
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healthy. Remember of course that we are by definition talking
about "discriminating against" (I would probably prefer the more
neutral language of "targeting") unconstitutional, ultra vires, fed-
eral conduct. And remember also that we have already seen that
any excessively punitive liability on federal officials should be
struck down as a "tax masquerading as a remedy."
With those limitations in place, what is to be gained by adding
a further "nontargeting" limitation? If states are obliged to police
their own officials as vigorously as they police federal officials,
they may police neither well. If forced to extend converse-1983
against state officials or abandon it altogether, states may well
choose the latter. And citizens victimized by unconstitutional gov-
ernment conduct will be even worse off. To borrow from Thomas
Jefferson's response to James Madison's concern that perhaps a
federal Bill of Rights would fail to fully protect all important
rights, "half a loaf is better than no bread. "30 Remedies against
the federal half of government misconduct are better than no
remedies at all.
This belief that targeting is permissible if it leads to greater
citizen protection against government unconstitutionality is not
merely a personal view. Rather, this belief underlies the American
Constitution's theory of federalism. Like separation of powers,
federalism is rooted in the idea that citizens must conquer govern-
ment power by dividing it. At bottom, this system is driven by a
basic intuition about human nature and organizational behavior:
without external checks, an actor or institution cannot be relied
upon to restrain its own misconduct; however, actors and insti-
tutions can be relied. on to restrain the misconduct of other actors
or institutions.· Thus, separation of powers encourages different
branches to restrain-to check and balance-each other's conduct.
Federal courts, for example, police Congress and the Executive via
judicial review, and these branches in turn check federal courts
via the appointments and impeachment processes, jurisdictional
statutes, and so on.
A similar dynamic drives federalism. Congress can often be
counted on to police state misconduct (witness section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment) but may often do a much more dubious
job of policing those officials carrying out its own laws. There is
no more dramatic illustration of this than 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself,
30. Letter of March 15, 1789, reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 620-23 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971).
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which of course provides a general cause of action against state
unconstitutionality, but not an equivalent general cause of action
against federal unconstitutionality. The beauty of federalism is that
citizens may use the laws-even the targeted laws-of another
government (the state) to protect them against federal lawlessness.
What Congress has "targeted out" through § 1983 (namely un-
constitutional conduct perpetrated by federal officials), states may
"target in." You may call this using state discrimination to sup-
plement congressional discrimination if you like, but I prefer the
language of The Federalist No. 51: "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition" so as to protect "the rights of the people. "31
And make no mistake, Publius is quite clear that the federal system
allows-indeed invites and even depends upon-state remedies jeal-
ously protecting citizen rights against federal officials. As Madison
wrote in The Federalist No. 51: "The different governments will
control each other. "32 Or as Hamilton stated even more pointedly
in an earlier Federalist Paper:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general gov-
ernment will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of
the state governments, and these will have the same disposition
towards the general government. ... If [the people's] rights are
invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instru-
ment of redress. ...
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system
that the State governments will, in a/l possible contingencies,
afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty
by the national authority.33
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
32. [d. at 323 (emphasis added).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added). I discuss these quotations, and the underlying vision of federalism they
represent in much greater detail in my original converse-1983 article. Amar, supra note I,
at 1425-29, 1441-43, 1492-1520. Further support for and elaboration of this vision appears
in Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
When I first discussed the above-quoted excerpt from THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra,
I described it as a set of "key words" that was nonetheless "seldom-quoted." Since then,
the Supreme Court, per Justice O'Connor, has quoted this passage in its entirety as a
cornerstone of the American theory of federalism. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct.
2395, 2400 (1991). I applaud this recognition, and the Court's placement of this key passage
alongside the more familiar words of THE FEDERALIST No. 51. Only last Term, the Court-
once again, per Justice O'Connor-relied on the vision laid out in Gregory to invalidate
an act of Congress on federalism grounds, for the first time in 50 years (not counting the
National League of Cities case, later reversed in Garcia). New York v. United States, 112
S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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The entire history of America in the late eighteenth century
embodied this ideal, with colonial governments championing their
citizens' rights against imperial oppression in the momentous years
between 1763 and 1776; and with the Virginia and Ken~ucky legis-
latures closing out the century by leading the charge against a new
form of "imperial" oppression and unconstitutionality in the garb
of the now infamous Alien and Sedition Acts. And when we
carefully examine the original Constitution and Bill of Rights, we
see over and over the theme of state law protection of interests
against federal oppression. For example, the nonsuspension of ha-
beas clause, the Constitution's most pointed allusion to remedies,
was designed to protect the pre-existing-that is, state law-based-
habeas remedy against possible federal abrogation. 34 The Fifth
Amendment protects property against federal deprivation without
due process and without just compensation. However, state law
typically defined whether a property right even existed to trigger
this protection. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of persons
to be secur~ in "their" houses, papers, effects and so on against
federal intrusion. But again, state law typically defined whether a
given "effect" or "house" belonged to a given individual.
The overall architecture of constitutional federalism is thus
designed to encourage states to use state law to vindicate federal
constitutional rights against the federal government. And this is why
I began my answer to the federalism questions raised by converse-
1983 by claiming that "converse-1983 is an expression-a celebra-
tion, really-of the American ideal of federalism, properly under-
stood. "
5. Assuming converse-1983 is proper, why is it
necessary? What would it add that is not already
protected by Bivens and other general state laws?
Bivens could in theory be overruled tomorrow. The theoretical
point is not wholly fanciful. As Dean Nichol and other astute
commentators have noted, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its
reluctance in recent years to follow Bivens by not applying its
precepts beyond the few situations, most importantly the Fourth
Amendment and the takings clause, where -the Supreme Court has
already approved implied causes of action under the Constitution.3s
34. See supra note 19.
35. In the academic literature, see Gene Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional
Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117 (1989). In the case law, see Schweiker v. Chilicky,
487 U.S. 412 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
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What's more, one of the two main doctrinal props underlying Bivens
was the line of cases, exemplified by J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,36
authorizing a federal common law inferring private rights of action
under federal statutes.37 Borak and its progeny were later abandoned
by the Supreme Court,38 raising the spectre that Bivens may be next.
rwe should, however, recall our earlier observation that the differ-
ences between the federal Constitution, on the one hand, and federal
statutes-the "prolix legal code"-on the other, could well justify
inferring causes of action only under the Constitution and not
statutes.)
If Bivens were overruled tomorrow, how would citizens be able
to gain redress when federal officers violate citizens' rights under
the Fourth Amendment and other constitutional provisions? By now,
the answer should be clear: by using state remedial law-just as,
before Bivens, state law was the only remedial game in town. But
as Bivens itself made clear, the Fourth Amendment protects interests
that may go beyond those covered by ordinary state trespass law-
as when the citizen "voluntarily" admits an officer into her house;
or when "unreasonable" electronic eavesdropping occurs without
any physical trespass.39 What's more, perhaps the general damage
rules for ordinary trespass may overlook, and thus fail to compen-
sate for, the special dignitary and other injuries created when gov-
ernment officials act unconstitutionally. 40 Thus if the only state law
remedy available is that of the general common law and general
state statutes, various margins of the Fourth Amendment and other
constitutional rights will be unenforced or underenforced. To take
another example: a federal law granting certain government largesse
only to whites might not violate any traditional common law liberty
or property right of blacks, but it surely would violate their equal
protection rights. But how could blacks get this case to court, and
get damages for past constitutional wrongs above and beyond an
injunction against future unconstitutionality? And how does one get
36. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
37. If under Borak, federal courts could infer private causes of action for violations
of federal statutes, why not also for constitutional-violations? The other main line of cases
undergirding Bivens grew out of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). If federal courts
could entertain injunctive actions directly under the Constitution, why not damage actions,
too? Both Borak and Young have deep roots in Marbury, as I show in Amar, supra note
5, at 447-48.
38. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). For a good
general discussion, see Calande, supra note 8; HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 945-
50.
39. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40. C/. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978).
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to court other cases involving constitutional violations that may not
precisely track traditional common law wrongs? A converse-1983
statute, almost by definition, is perfectly tailored-targeted, if you
will-to fill these gaps so that state remedial law is absolutely
coextensive with the precise scope of its citizens' federal constitu-
tional rights; and as fully compensatory as the Supreme Court will
allow.
But even if Bivens is not overruled, state converse-1983 can
make a big difference. What the Supreme Court gave. with one
hand in Bivens, it largely took away in later cases creating various
zones of immunity for government officials.41 The Court has never
said that the Constitution requires these zones of immunity. Nor,
to my knowledge, has the Court ever applied these zones of im-
munity where a cause of action for unconstitutional federal conduct
was created by state law, such as trespass law. Thus it remains
quite possible that state converse-1983 laws might not need to allow
"good faith" defenses for various federal officers. Disallowing these
defenses is in no way unfair to the individual officer defendants,
who will invariably be reimbursed by their government employer.42
By contrast, to create such a defense is in effect to make the citizen
victim liable, even though she is by hypothesis utterly faultless, and
the government official violated the Constitution. For this reason,
throughout the entire eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, govern-
ment officials generally enjoyed no immunity whatsoever if they
were deemed to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct, even
where a federal official was being sued under a state law cause of
action. 43
Why might the Supreme Court allow state law to be more
generous towards citizen victims (on either the immunity issue, or
possibly on the issue of quantum of damages) than the Court itself
has been under Bivens? Perhaps because the Court itself has been
dubious of the legitimacy of Bivens and has chosen to tread very
carefully and gingerly. Even though Bivens is not a species of the
Swift v. Tyson44 type of "general'" federal common law condemned
41. See, e.g., Harlow v. Filzgeriild, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
42. On the uniform practice of government indemnification, see Theodore Eisenberg
& Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641,
686 (1987); Lant B. Davis et aI., Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J.
781, 811 (1979).
43. See generally David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Gov-
ernmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. I (1972); HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 2, at
1292.
44. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842).
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in Erie, but is rather a prime example of what Judge Friendly
labelled the "new" federal common law,4S it was condemned as
illegitimate by several dissenters in Bivens, including Justice Black.
But however controversial federal common law-"new" or old-
fashioned by federal judges may be, no one disputes the common
law role of state judges. Thus, Justice Black went out of his way
in his Bivens dissent to concede that he would cheerfully enforce a
cause of action against lawless federal officials if either "Congress
[] or the State of New York" had created such a cause of action.46
And as we have already noted, under Erie and the Rules of Decision
Act, such a cause of action could be created by either a statute
passed by the New York legislature or a common law norm fash-
ioned by New York courts.
To put the point doctrinally and defensively: the Bivens line of
cases limited recovery (by creating immunities and restricting the
quantum of damages) for reasons that may well not apply to
converse-1983 laws. If the Supreme Court wants to limit Bivens, it
can do so with minimal justification: what it created, it can destroy.
But if the Supreme Court wants to limit state law causes of action,
it must, under the Rules of Decision Act and the Tenth Amendment,
explain why the state's more generous compensation is somehow
unconstitutional. At least where the issue is whether federal officials
must enjoy immunity for unconstitutional conduct, the Supreme
Court will find it hard to distinguish away scores of cases from the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries enforcing state law without rec-
ognizing any immunity.47
To put the point structurally and affirmatively: where, as in
Bivens, the federal judiciary is taking on the federal Executive all
alone, it is wont to act very cautiously. But if given encouragement
from state statutory or common law, the federal judiciary may be
emboldened to go further and provide full remedies for violations
of constitutional rights. Converse-1983 is exactly this kind of legal/
moral/political encouragement, especially if a state explicitly states
that it intends to authorize "the maximum amount of recovery that
45. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
46. 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
47. For a recognition that federal judicial power to create immunities for constitutional
wrongs is limited where a legislature has expressly decided otherwise, see Burns v. Reed,
111 S. Ct. 1934, 1945-46 & n.1 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). And it is of course well understood that various immunities recognized
by Bivens are not constitutionally required. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court
Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1128, 1173 (1986).
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is permissible under the federal Constitution"-in the same way
that some state long arm jurisdiction statutes explicitly seek to
authorize the "maximum amount of personal jurisdiction that is
permissible under the federal Constitution."
6. Why would states. have an incentive to adopt
converse-1983?
Two sets of rather different incentives are at work here. Con-
sider first the baser set: money. Converse-1983 laws provide com-
pensation for a state's citizens who have been victimized by federal
lawlessness, thereby bringing money into the state. Of course, the
individual defendants may also be state residents, but as noted
earlier, the almost invariable· practice is for the federal government
to indemnify such officials, presumably out of general revenue
derived from all the states. Benefits are localized, yet costs are
largely externalized.
Three qualifications must be noted about this base motivation.
First, we should recall that any state incentive to plunder is of
course constrained by my earlier rule that converse-1983 recovery
must not be so excessive that it is merely a "tax masquerading as
a remedy." Second, base motivation is not inconsistent with a
constitutional scheme designed to harness human nature-even base
motivations like "jealousy," "ambition" and "love of power"-
through structural mechanisms such as federalism and separation of
powers so as to protect rights. Third, I doubt that money will in
fact be a strong positive motivation. But at least states need not
fear becoming the analogue of a "welfare magnet" if they do the'
right thing and enact converse-1983 laws.
This brings me to the real, loftier set of incentives for converse-
1983. States should enact converse-1983 laws because doing so is in
the highest tradition of supporting the federal Constitution and
vindicating its implicit remedial scheme, which so heavily depends
on each government policing the other to vindicate citizen rights.
The world around us is awash in constitutional reform. Suppose
a friend from Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union were to
ask an American, "why federalism, why states?" The first answer
at the Founding of our Constitution, and the first answer in the
Federalist Papers, is also my answer:48 we have states, first and
foremost, so that they can help protect us when the central govern-
48. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 483, 497-506 (1991),
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ment violates our constitutional rights (and we have a central gov-
ernment so that it can help protect us when states violate our
constitutional rights). This answer, it seems to me, is much stronger
than one associated with Justice Brennan's famous celebration of
state constitutions in a now classic article,. State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights.49 In that article, Justice Brennan
talked about how wonderful it was that under a system of feder-
alism, state constitutions could provide additional rights against
states, above and beyond those required by the federal Constitution.
If Justice Brennan were to offer this reason to our hypothetical
visitor from Europe, I could well imagine the following response:
I do not understand, my friend. If states did not exist, did not
have great power over me, I of course would not need any rights
against states. Why am I better off with two sets of governments
that can bully me, rather than one? Are you saying anything
more than the following: states need not be as abusive towards
their citizens as the federal government allows them to be?
What's more, in providing additional protection against them-
selves, a la Justice Brennan, states are not, strictly speaking, en-
forcing federal constitutional rights as such. If a state court provides
additional safeguards against state police searches and seizures,
above and beyond what is required by the Fourth Amendment (as
applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment), it can and will
be reversed by the Supreme Court unless it makes clear that its
action is rooted not in the federal Constitution, but solely in state
law. so By contrast, converse-1983 enables state courts to use state
law to vindicate federal constitutional rights as such.
Justice Brennan's thesis might also seem applicable when state
constitutions furnish citizens with additional rights against private
parties. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,s I for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the California Su-
preme Court's use of state law to compel a shopping center owner
to provide access to leafletters. Under the California Constitution,
"state action" was defined more expansively than in the federal
First and Fourteenth Amendments, thus allowing the leafletters to
49. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
50. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975) ("a State may not impose ... greater restrictions [on its police] as a matter of
federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them. ")
(emphasis in original).
51. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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succeed in their suit against a private property owner. Yet once
again, any celebration of federalism here can only be half-hearted.
To say that the state has the power to reach private conduct not
addressed by the federal Constitution is to say nothing of the way
in which it will exercise that power. Pruneyard identifies no struc-
tural reason to believe that the state will systematically exercise its
powers in ways that promote federal constitutional values like free
speech or life, liberty, and property. Any argument praising dual
federalism for giving citizens a second chance at the state level to
get additional rights against others is distinctly double-edged: such
dual federalism also creates a second risk for citizens that additional
duties on them towards others will be imposed (as the shopping
center owner in Pruneyard can painfully attest to).
Put another way, precisely because ex hypothesis no federal
constitutional rights are at stake when state courts decide whether
to go "beyond" a federal constitutional right, it is hard to see how
doing so promotes federal constitutional values as such. Justice
Brennan's argument seems to trade on unspoken intuitions that a
"real" federal constitutional interest resides on one side of a state
law dispute (for example, with a citizen challenging a police search
or with the leafletters in Pruneyard), but that real interest has been
too narrowly construed by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (for
example, by expanding the category of permissible searches, or
stiffening the First and Fourteenth Amendments' state action re-
quirement's). In such cases, the argument runs, state judges can use
state constitutions to enforce the "shadow" federal constitutional
rights underenforced by federal courts. But the validity of disposition
under state constitutional law in no way depends on whether the
state constitution is invoked on behalf of the real federal rights-
holder. In Pruneyard, for example, the state constitution might well
have permissibly prohibited municipalities from enacting ordinances
requiring special access for leafletters. In short, we have no structural
account of why state constitutions and state judges can be expected
to systematically promote "underenforced" federal constitutional
norms. Converse-1983, by contrast, attempts to highlight how and
why states might indeed be able to promote federal constitutional
norms underenforced by Bivens.
7. Does converse-1983 violate federal sovereign
immunity?
No, so long as suit lies only against individual officers. As a
matter of legal doctrine, there is no sovereign immunity bar even
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where it is clear that the "immune" government will undoubtedly
indemnify the "nonimmune" official. 52 .
8. Does converse-1983 apply when federal officials
violate federal statutes?
No. Unlike the words of § 1983, which apply to state action
in violation of either the federal Constitution or federal laws,s3 I
propose that converse-1983 be limited to federal action in violation
of the federal Constitution. The reason for this limitation is simple.
Congress, as the source of a federal statute, is generally free to
qualify or condition that statute. If Congress chooses to impose
statutory limits on a federal official, yet decides not to allow
private suits for damages in the event that the official violates the
statute, states must respect this congressional choice. The situation
is very different, however, where a federal official violates a federal
constitutional right. Congress has no power to authorize this of-
ficial's unconstitutional conduct; and the prohibition is not simply
one of Congress's creation. Since Congress has no "greater power"
to eliminate the restriction on federal action, it has considerably
less power to thwart states from enforcing this restriction via
private causes of action.
9. Does this mean that Congress could never preempt
a state converse-1983 law?
No. There is a legitimate federal interest in uniformity, elim-
inating a patchwork of state law remedies so that a federal officer's
liability will not wildly fluctuate as he moves from state to state
(say, in ,pursuing drug traffic). But for reasons I explained in more
detail in-my original article,s4 if Congress seeks to oust state law
here, Congress must itself provide a federal remedy at least as
generous as the most generous state remedy Congress seeks to
preempt (assuming, of course, that the state law remedy was not
independently unco'nstitutional-i.e., so punitive so as to amount
to a "tax masquerading as a remedy").
52. Elsewhere, I have spelled out at length my views that where the government
violates the Constitution, it is neither "sovereign" nor "immune," and that direct liability
of the government itself is often appropriate. See generally Amar, supra note I.
Since the Supreme Court has historically rejected this view, and for now shows little
sign of movement, I shall not press the point here-especially given that as a practical
matter, individual officer. liability is a pretty good second-best approximation.
53. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
54. Amar, supra note I, at 1518-19.
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10. What is stopping us? Why aren't states jumping
on the converse-J983 bandwagon?
Perhaps because lawyers and lawmakers-state peoples, state
legislatures, state courts-have not been aware of states' dramatic
options concerning converse-1983. If that is indeed even part of
the problem, I hope this lecture, and all of us gathered here today,
will be part of the solution.
